Capt. Qaisar Qayyum, a Master Mariner and independent maritime and bunkering adviser. Image Credit: Capt. Qaisar Qayyum

• Most operational trouble comes from information failing to move between competent people, not from incompetence, says former Vitol Bunkers operations chief Capt. Qaisar Qayyum
• A concern raised at two in the morning is worth more than a report filed after the vessel has sailed
• Deal with the problem before deciding whose fault it is; an extra survey or test is cheap next to a claim
• Full paper free to download from Ship & Bunker here

The bunker industry has no shortage of procedures, and that is not the problem, according to a new paper by a veteran of two decades of bunker operations at Fujairah.

Capt. Qaisar Qayyum, a Master Mariner and independent maritime and bunkering adviser who ran those operations latterly as general manager of bunkering operations in the UAE for Vitol Bunkers, argues in the paper, published by Ship & Bunker, that what decides a delivery is the side of the operation that never makes it into a manual: whether the people involved trust each other enough to speak up.

"Many operational difficulties develop not because any one of these people lacks competence, but because information fails to move effectively between them," he writes.

A barge master, a cargo officer, a trader, the operations desk, technical management, the tank farm, and the surveyor are all looking at the same stem from different positions, Qayyum notes, and each can reach a perfectly reasonable conclusion from what it can see while missing what the others are dealing with.

When a barge master hesitates over an operation that looks manageable from the office, "neither perspective should automatically overrule the other," he writes.

His answer is to treat reporting during a delivery as part of the operation rather than paperwork around it, so that a developing problem is visible "while something could still be done about it".

That depends on people feeling able to call, and on how the call is received.

"If somebody telephones at two in the morning with a genuine concern and is made to feel that the call was unwelcome, he may hesitate before making the next one," Qayyum writes.

"From an operational point of view, the consequences of that hesitation may be far greater than the inconvenience of being disturbed during the night."

The same logic applies once something has gone wrong, where he says the first requirement is to establish the facts and limit the consequences, not to decide which department owns the problem.

An independent surveyor, extra sampling, or a laboratory test may cost money, he notes, "but that cost can be insignificant compared with allowing uncertainty to develop into a vessel delay, product dispute or customer claim."

Claims prevention, on this view, begins long before a claim arrives, in relationships built during ordinary operations when nothing is in dispute, a theme that runs through his earlier paper on debunkering.

"A checklist can require a report, but it cannot create the confidence to make the call," Qayyum writes.

"A procedure can allocate responsibility, but it cannot create mutual respect between departments."

The full paper, Beyond the Bunkering Checklist: The Human Side of Bunker Operations That Procedures Cannot Fully Capture, can be downloaded here.